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LABOR RELATIONS COLLABORATION FROM START
TO FINISH: A CASE STUDY ON A FIRST CONTRACT
FOR WESTMINSTER COLORADO FIREFIGHTERS
By Lisa R. Callaway and Rebecca C. Barnard*

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
For many labor negotiations practitioners, regardless of whether they are on
the labor or management side, the certification of a new bargaining unit is a
familiar event, noteworthy only in the fact that previously unrepresented
employees now have representation. Where some states’ public sector labor
relations acts go back decades, the public sector labor boards overseeing the
statutes are regularly certifying new bargaining units, some through secret
ballot elections and others through card check.1
In Westminster, Colorado, a new collective bargaining statute signed into
law in 2013 provided public sector employees with substantive bargaining
rights. Westminster firefighters organized their workforce and sought
bargaining rights with their employer, the City of Westminster. This article
focuses on the creative and collaborative manner in which this occurred from
start to finish, from drafting a referendum question and City ordinance to
bargaining of the first contract using the FMCS Affinity Bargaining model.
The City of Westminster is a home rule municipality, a suburb of Denver
located to its northwest. Westminster has a population of approximately
112,000 residents and is located in Adams and Jefferson counties.2
The Westminster Fire Department operates from six fire stations. In
addition to traditional fire department services, the Department has EMS
and ambulance services; performs water rescues and technical rescues; and
responds to hazardous material incidents and other emergencies. The
Department also responds to large scale disasters through the City’s
emergency management program.3 Under the Fire Chief’s direction there
are two divisions: (1) Administrative; and (2) Operations and Emergency
Services. There is a deputy chief heading each of the divisions. On the
administrative side, there are battalion chiefs, a training chief, and an EMS
chief. The bargaining unit is made up of captains, lieutenants, paramedics,
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engineers and firefighters. There are approximately 136 sworn employees in
the Fire Department and 121 employees in the bargaining unit.4
Besides the firefighters, represented by International Association of Fire
Fighters (IAFF), Local 2889, no other Westminster employees are
represented by a union.
II. HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RIGHTS IN
COLORADO
Colorado’s labor history dates back to the 1940s. Following the passage of
the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, in 1943, Colorado passed the Labor
Peace Act.5 The law required a vote of 50% plus one for a union to become
the exclusive representative of a group of employees. Assuming the first vote
passed, the second vote, requiring a seventy-five-vote plurality, determined
whether there would be an “all-union” agreement. If the all-union vote
passed, the employees would be covered by a union security agreement (i.e.,
union shop with mandatory dues).6
After the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) repealed the requirement for
a separate election for security agreements in 1951, there was confusion
regarding whether or not a separate vote for a union security agreement was
still required in Colorado. Many unions, believing it was no longer necessary
to hold a second vote, chose not to. However, in 1976 the Supreme Court of
Colorado held in Communication Workers of America v. Western Electric
Co. that a separate vote was required for passing a union security agreement,
resulting in the invalidation of thousands of union security agreements.7
Then in 1977, the Colorado legislature passed a law permitting unions that
had not ratified their union security agreements separately to ratify the
agreements through a written agreement between the employer and union,
thus saving many union agreements.8 Separate ratification would be
required for all agreements after June 29, 1977.9 The procedure continues to
exist today.
In 2007, following Democratic Governor Bill Ritter’s election, and with a
Democratically-controlled state house and senate, unions attempted to
repeal the requirement for a separate election for union security agreements
through HB 1072. In February 2007, Governor Ritter vetoed the bill, citing
political divisiveness and the lack of open dialogue between the
stakeholders.10 But later in that same year, Governor Ritter signed an
executive order recognizing labor unions and permitting them to negotiate
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with the state government.11 For the first time, Colorado public sector unions
had some bargaining rights, albeit that the right was limited as any
agreement reached was non-binding.
Following the signing of the executive order, a right-to-work measure was
placed on the 2008 ballot, asking:
Shall there be an amendment to the Colorado constitution
concerning participation in a labor organization as a condition of
employment, and, in connection therewith, prohibiting an
employer from requiring that a person be a member and pay any
moneys to a labor organization or to any other third party in lieu
of payment to a labor organization and creating a misdemeanor
criminal penalty for any person who violates the provision of the
section?12
The measure was defeated with 56.1% of voters voting no.13 In 2009,
Governor Ritter vetoed a bill that would have given firefighters a right to
collectively bargain.14 Despite repeated attempts, Colorado remains a nonright-to-work state today, along with twenty-two other states.15
In 2013, “The Colorado Firefighter Safety Act” (also known as Senate Bill 13025 or SB 25), gave Colorado firefighters a path to a potential collective
bargaining right.16 Senator Lois Tochtrop introduced the bill on January 9,
2013.17 In February of that year, Democratic Governor John Hickenlooper
threatened to veto the bill because it did not give municipalities a say in
unionization. He stated: “[W]e do not believe it is a matter of state interest
to require mandatory bargaining between a locality and its firefighters.”18 SB
25 was passed by the Senate with a 20-14 approval on April 26, 2013, and
signed into law by the governor on June 5, 2013 in a form that, according to
him, provided municipalities with the voice in collective bargaining he was
looking for.19
While cloaked under firefighter safety, with the recitals in the final law
further emphasizing firefighter safety, SB 25 is a true collective bargaining
law. It includes an obligation to “meet and confer” for all municipal
employers and their firefighters20 and codifies a municipality’s and union’s
mutual obligation to engage in collective bargaining, with the traditional
good faith bargaining obligation, to discuss “compensation, hours, and terms
and conditions of employment” and to execute a written contract
memorializing their agreements for a period of between one and three
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years.21 The collective bargaining obligation applies to public employers that
employ twenty-four or more firefighters.22
The term “compensation” is expressly defined by SB 25. “Compensation” is
“base wages or salary; any form of direct monetary payments; employer-paid
health, accident, life, and disability insurance programs; employer-paid
pension programs, including the amount of pension and contributions to the
extent not controlled by law; deferred compensation; retiree health
programs; paid time off; uniform and equipment allowances; expense
reimbursement; and all eligibility conditions for compensation.”23 Unlike
many statutes, and often where the interpretation is left to labor boards and
courts, the SB 25 definition appears contained and finite. Similarly, "terms
and conditions of employment" is defined as “compensation, hours, and all
matters affecting the employment of firefighters, including items related to
safety, except the budget and organizational structure of the public
employer.”24 SB 25 also includes an obligation by the public employer to
deduct union dues and assessments from its employees upon written request
to the employer.25
In order to gain collective bargaining rights, the Colorado Firefighter Safety
Act requires a group of firefighters to turn to the voters for approval, via the
voter referendum process.26 The Act defines firefighter as “an employee of a
public employer whose primary duties are directly involved with the
provision of fire protection or firefighting services.” It continues:
“‘Firefighter’ does not include clerical personnel or volunteer firefighters.”27
In order to get a referendum on the ballot, a firefighter employee
organization must provide the employer with a notice of intent to circulate a
petition amongst voters. The notice of intent must be signed by at least
seventy-five percent of the proposed bargaining unit. Following submission
of a notice of intent, representatives from the proposed bargaining unit must
obtain signatures from five percent of voters unless a city charter or local
ordinance declares otherwise.28 Assuming the requisite number of
signatures is obtained, the referendum question is: “Should the firefighters
employed by the [name of the public employer] be covered by the ‘Colorado
Firefighter Safety Act’?”29 A simple majority vote is required for the
referendum to pass. In the event the referendum fails, the issue may not be
placed on the ballot again for four years.30
Colorado Springs is currently following the procedure set forth by the Act.
The International Association of Firefighters (IAFF), Local 5 collected
16,000 voter signatures to earn a place on the April 2019 ballot.31 Firefighter
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unions in Denver, Fort Collins, Aurora, and Pueblo, Colorado all have
collective bargaining status.32 Other Colorado communities with collective
bargaining agreements with their firefighters include Arvada, Boulder,
Thornton, and Commerce City, and there are fire protection district
collective bargaining agreements as well.
III. THE WESTMINSTER FIREFIGHTER BARGAINING RIGHTS
PROCESS
A.

The Ballot Initiative

In 2014, the Westminster IAFF, Local 2889 (Local 2889), petitioned the
Westminster City Council to authorize collective bargaining for the
Westminster firefighters. Local 2889 members had begun the process of
getting signatures to satisfy the requirements of the Firefighter Safety Act
and gain recognition as the exclusive representative for the Westminster
firefighters. The City Council’s consideration of Local 2889’s request
continued into early 2015 when new City Manager Don Tripp came to
Westminster. City Manager Tripp began meeting with Local 2889
representatives to understand the Local’s concerns, and Fire Chief Doug Hall
was brought into the discussions. Over several weeks, twenty-one separate
meetings were held with more than 150 Westminster Fire Department staff
in attendance (some attended more than one meeting). Through these
meetings, City Administration and Local 2889 Executive Board
representatives worked together to find resolutions to the Local’s concerns
and began to develop a collaborative relationship and problem-solving
model.
On February 18, 2016, Local 2889 delivered to the City a Notice of Intent to
circulate a petition pursuant to the Colorado Firefighter Safety Act. City
Manager Tripp reached out to Local 2889 with an innovative idea. Since SB
25 permitted the City to adopt a local ordinance with an alternative
procedure to the tedious process of obtaining voter signatures, the City
Manager proposed that the City would waive the signature requirement if the
parties would work together on an agreeable ballot question. The City
proposed that it then would put the ballot question regarding representation
to the Westminster voters.
The City and Local 2889 worked collaboratively to draft an acceptable ballot
question—one that would be supported by the City Council, Local 2889
leadership, and the Local’s membership. There were multiple drafts, some
not acceptable to Local 2889. At one point in the process, Local 2889
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leadership continued to collect voter signatures, resorting to the SB 25
process. In May, Local 2889 President Ron Taylor contacted City Manager
Tripp to make one more attempt to try to find mutually acceptable ballot
language. The parties were successful and on May 16, 2016, the City Council
approved the resolution for the agreeable referendum question.
The City called a special election (Westminster regular elections are only held
in odd years) to set the firefighter collective bargaining ballot question for
the November 8, 2016, general election. The ballot referendum question,
titled “Firefighters’ Safety and Collective Bargaining Question,” was:
Shall the City Council of the City of Westminster enact an ordinance by
July 1, 2017, which would prohibit Westminster firefighters from
striking and create a mutual obligation between the designated
representative of Westminster firefighters and the City to bargain
collectively in good faith with respect to such terms that include, but
might not be limited to, wages, benefits, and items related to personal
safety, with such agreements made upon these terms memorialized in
a contract enacted by the City Council, with disputes resolved by nonbinding arbitration with impasses to be submitted to the electors of the
City for final resolution?
The ballot question passed with 57 percent voter approval.
B.

Drafting the Ordinance

With the referendum approved and the vote certified, the clock began ticking
for the drafting of the ordinance. The drafting and approval process had to
be completed by July 1, 2017, a relatively short timeline. It was now up to
City officials to flush out the details of what was, in effect, a collective
bargaining statute. Because there existed no statute to outline collective
bargaining duties and obligations, it was up to the City Council to adopt an
ordinance providing the type of detail that usually exists in a public sector
labor statute.
Items that needed to be addressed in the ordinance included:
a. A general statement of policy to define the purpose and
parameters of the ordinance;
b. A list of relevant definitions for terms used throughout the
ordinance, including a definition for the terms used in the
referendum question;
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c. A list of preserved management rights;
d. A prohibition against strikes, work stoppages and similar
behaviors, to capture the same in the referendum question;
e. A list of inherent employee rights existing in addition to the
collective union rights;
f. A process for certification, decertification, and recognition of
an exclusive representative;
g. A statement of the obligation to collectively bargain, the
obligation to incorporate agreements into a collective
bargaining agreement and the relevant timelines for the
process;
h. An impasse resolution procedure, including the use of an
advisory fact-finder and non-binding arbitration and the right
of either party to submit any issues not agreed upon to the
voters.33
The Westminster ordinance drafting process began in January 2017. Like the
ballot question initiative, drafting the ordinance involved collaborative
efforts. Drafting the ordinance took approximately four months and included
input from staff, Council members, Local Executive Board members and City
and Local 2889 legal counsel. To start the process, the City Council and Local
2889 agreed to core principles that would guide their discussions and the
drafting of the ordinance. Those principles included the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Protect the (City) Charter and home rule authority
Maintain competitive market-based wage and benefit
package
Provide for fire union input
Protect management rights
Protect the safety of employees and citizens
Maintain equity to all employees as individuals
Bargain based on interests vs. positional, using an interestbased bargaining model
Ensure that the agreed-upon collective bargaining
agreement is financially sustainable and fiscally
responsible
Protect employee rights
Create employee engagement and opportunities for
positive change
Build respectful relationships between labor, management
and all stakeholders.
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Notably, the principles (7) bargain based on interests vs. positional and (11)
build respectful relationships between labor, management and all
stakeholders carried forward the collaborative approach that began with the
drafting of the referendum question. While City and Union rights and input
were key, principles 6, 9 and 10 addressed maintaining the rights of the
individual employee, an important goal for the Council and City staff.
With a draft of the ordinance taking many iterations, the City worked to
incorporate as much of the Local’s input as was possible, while not conceding
important management rights or other rights mandated under the City
Charter. The Local wanted, for instance, a broader definition of the subjects
for collective bargaining. It also wanted the rank of captain to be included in
the bargaining unit, which the City subsequently agreed to during the
ordinance discussions. The City also agreed to an ordinance giving some
broader bargaining rights. However, the City was not agreeable to including
minimum staffing or scheduling as subjects for bargaining.34
The ordinance was adopted by the City Council in May 2017, with members
of the Local 2889 Executive Board present as a showing of support. The core
principles were carried forward and are contained in the Statement of Policy
at the very beginning of the final ordinance.35
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) certified Local 2889 as the
“certified employee organization” on December 8, 2017, after a secret ballot
election was conducted. The vote was 109-0. On January 10, 2018, the City
received a demand to bargain.
IV. THE INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING MODEL
The City and Local 2889 were committed to negotiating their first contract
using an interest-based bargaining (IBB) process. They believed that if the
relationship started based on IBB principals, it would be a solid foundation
for their relationship moving forward. The parties sought out the assistance
of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) to facilitate the
process.
A.

The FMCS Interest-Based Bargaining Model

FMCS describes interest-based bargaining as “a collaborative approach to
resolving labor and management disputes. Through the process, parties
proactively identify durable solutions to outcomes at the bargaining table.
Agreements are based on mutual and individual interests rather than
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positions. This approach emphasizes problem solving and enables mutual
gain outcomes.”36 Javier Ramirez, FMCS Director, Agency Initiatives,
explains that the parties are not spending their time strategizing when to
make a move, but rather are focused on solving the problem.37 Essentially
the parties are transforming negotiations from a win-lose strategy into a
puzzle to be solved by the group as a whole.
In Roger Fisher and William Ury’s classic book Getting to Yes, the authors
explain that a negotiation method “should produce a wise agreement…,
should be efficient…, [and] should improve or at least not damage the
relationship between the parties.”38 Fisher and Ury developed a theory of
negotiation called “principled negotiation,” later named interest-based
bargaining (“IBB”) by FMCS.39 The IBB method “produces wise agreements
amicably and efficiently.”40
Fisher and Ury describe four key ideas that form principled negotiation: “1)
people: separate the people from the problem; 2) focus on interests, not
positions; 3) options: generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what
to do; and 4) insist that the result be based on an objective standard.”41
The FMCS interest-based bargaining model directly embodies these four
elements.42 The FMCS model is a group problem-solving process that focuses
on the common interests of the parties to create effective solutions which can
be supported by the entire group. It is intended to strengthen the labormanagement relationship. All conversations and interactions occur at the
joint table between the designated team members. Any caucuses, which are
discouraged, are an exception and must be limited. A simplified explanation
of the process is as follows:
1.

Framing the Issues

Each party must frame its individual issues to identify the topics of
negotiation, as opposed to presenting proposals in traditional
negotiations. The issue-framing procedure is known as the “what,” or
“what is the problem we’re trying to solve?” There is a process to
framing issues, however, so they don’t look like positional, adversarial,
and win-lose propositions. The steps in the issue-framing process
include: 1) express the topic as a question; 2) frame the question as a
joint problem; 3) ask the question objectively; 4) do not suggest the
answer by the manner in which the question is phrased; and 5) leave
the problem open to multiple solutions. For example, a concern might
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be stated in traditional negotiations as “Employees are claiming that
overtime is being improperly assigned based on favoritism and are
demanding that this practice be stopped immediately and that
supervisors be instructed on proper procedures.” Using the FMCS
issue framing process, the same issue might be restated as: “What can
we do to improve procedures in the assignment of overtime?”43
2.

Identifying Interests

As part of the parties’ transition from sharing the issues to identifying
their interests, an individual or group shares the story of the issue. For
instance, “this is why we want to talk about this situation.” It is best to
be specific and provide examples so others can truly gain an
understanding of the reason(s) for raising the issue.
3.

Generate Options

The process of getting to options, or the “how” of the process, is the
next step. Like the previous steps, there is great value to the group’s
hearing options and building additional solutions from what is stated.
There are invariably multiple options to resolve an issue so this step is
best accomplished by permitting the free-flow of potential options with
the philosophy that “no idea is a bad idea.” Sometimes options are only
partial options to solve the issue, which is acceptable. A partial option
might raise another partial option to work in tandem. An option is not
a proposal and does not have to solve the entire issue to be included.
In any event, the options will be discussed and evaluated by the entire
group to determine each one’s viability.
4.

Review Standards for Evaluation

Under the FMCS model, there is a standardized process for reviewing
and determining the efficacy of all options. This standards evaluation
process is referred to as the F, B, and A process.
First, a specific option must be feasible. It must be capable
of being done. Factors to use in determining feasibility
include the legality of the option; whether it’s affordable;
whether it’s workable and practical; and whether it’s
understandable.44
The second standard is whether the option is beneficial.
This standard requires the parties to evaluate each option
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based on whether it improves the condition that caused the
issue to be raised. If it doesn’t satisfy a party’s interest, or
causes harm, then this standard has not been met.45
The third standard is whether the option is acceptable. The
option has to be favorably received by both parties to pass
this standard. It’s critical that when evaluating the
acceptability standard, the evaluation is simply whether
the option is acceptable and not whether this is the most
acceptable option. Because a participant likes another
option better is not a reason to fail to support an acceptable
option at this stage of the process.46
5.

Evaluate the Options

One by one, the parties will review each option for each issue statement
individually to determine the F, B, and A status. If an option doesn’t
make it past any of the standards, it is immediately discarded. For
example, an option must be feasible to get to the beneficial standard
analysis. If it is not feasible, it is discarded without any further analysis.
Additionally, all options are evaluated by consensus. If an individual
does not like an option and others do, that individual has to explain
why the option is not acceptable to the individual. It also bears
repeating that the analysis is not whether a particular option is the best
option, but whether it is an acceptable option having applied all three
factors.
B.

Keys to Success in the Process

This interest-based bargaining process supports the two parties’ working
together and discourages any behaviors that get in the way. When a
participant puts an option up for consideration, the option is the group’s
idea, not a union participant’s idea or an employer participant’s idea.47 This
part of the process allows the group to focus on interests and options, not on
what side came up with the idea, thus allowing everyone to view the idea
objectively. There is also an important “circle-back” step, a last step in the
process, where the participants review their work to ensure their agreements
are in alignment with their predetermined objective criteria.
Another important step is agreement on and collection of data. All
participants must agree on what information they need to resolve all contract
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issues. This should occur prior to the start of the issues/interests/options
process so the parties are not distracted, and so that time is not wasted
chasing down information when the parties are in the middle of the process,
thus slowing momentum. This is particularly important with respect to
financial data (also see Affinity model below.) There is typically extensive
discussion surrounding the financial data needed and then secondly, how to
read and interpret that data. For instance, in traditional negotiations, there
is often a dispute regarding how to calculate wage increases—do you include
roll up costs or are they excluded? Is longevity included in wage increase
percentage calculations or is it calculated separately? As a result, when
determining what a .25% wage increase costs, the parties often reach
different conclusions. With interest-based bargaining, these calculations are
discussed and agreed to as a group. So when the parties get to economic
discussions, all participants are in agreement as to the value of a .25%
increase and how it is calculated.
Another key to success in this process is using a third-party facilitator. The
importance of a facilitator who is not connected to a party and who has
nothing to be gained by process outcomes is imperative. Such an
independent facilitator can offer unbiased opinions and nudge the parties
from time to time without motivation or the impropriety of such.
Additionally, the independent facilitator can move into a mediation role if
this is determined necessary.
C.

The Affinity Model

When getting to economic issues, the FMCS interest-based bargaining model
was found by FMCS to have limitations. It works with great success and
positive outcomes when addressing the non-economic issues—any issues
that do not have a direct and substantial economic impact. However, when
applied to economic issues, FMCS found that the process often broke down.
When union participants are looking for a wage increase, applying the
issue/interest/options analysis was a strain. It was difficult to maintain
objectivity and reach consensus. Participants tended to gravitate to
traditional bargaining behaviors.
With the goal of maintaining an interest-based approach from start to finish,
FMCS mediators were determined to find a way for the parties not to slide
back to traditional bargaining. The Hinsdale, Illinois office of FMCS
developed an alternate process which the agency titled the Affinity Economic
Bargaining (AEB or Affinity) model as an effective problem-solving way to
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approach the economic issues in bargaining.48 FMCS soon saw success in the
AEB model for resolving economic issues in an efficient way. The Affinity
model is now used nationwide.
The AEB model modified the Affinity diagraming tool, essentially reversing
the process. Affinity diagraming is a facilitation tool that can be used to sort
large amounts of data or ideas.49 It was originally developed by Kawakita Jiro
in the 1960s and is also known as the KJ Method. Jiro describes his idea for
the process, saying, “[w]ith masses of data spread around on my desk, I had
been racking my brains to find some way to integrate them when I suddenly
realized that depending on the spatial arrangement of the cards, you can see
new meaning in them and find ways to synthesize the data.”50 While
originally developed to sort academic data, it has become an integral part of
the Affinity model. Some facilitators continue to facilitate Affinity with an
old-fashioned flip-chart and others have incorporated the use of various
software programs at different stages of the process, such as mind mapping
and collaboration software, to improve efficiencies.
The Affinity process includes five steps: 1) Preparation; 2) Set Up; 3)
Brainwriting; 4) Working the Puzzle; and 5) Final Consensus and Approval.51
It borrows on the concepts and rules used in the regular IBB, Affinity
Diagramming, Human Behavior (neuroscience principles) considerations,
and a newly-created step to build a zone of possible agreement (explained
below). FMCS also insists that the parties do not caucus during the Affinity
economic bargaining steps 3, 4, and 5.
1.

Preparation

This is the official beginning of the Affinity process. It further
breaks down into four parts with terminology and process
similar to the IBB process discussed above. The steps are “1) issue
identification, and, if necessary, grouping; 2) interest
identification; 3) information identification, gathering, and
review; and 4) development of a common economic language.”52
Issue identification is determining the real economic issues that
are concerns for each of the parties. The process is different than
identifying issues in traditional negotiations, where each party
includes non-critical “bargaining chip” issues. In Affinity
bargaining, each party is required to explain and defend its
issues, so it is critical the parties only include issues they are truly
concerned with and not throw-away issues.53 There is frequently
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similarity in issues, and those issues can be grouped. For
instance, if the union seeks more time off and the employer wants
to clarify procedures for when certain time off can be taken, these
issues may be grouped as they are similar concerns.
After identifying the issues, each party must discuss the interests
related to each of its issues, so the other party can understand
why the issue is important to the party who raised it. This is
similar to the “telling the story” concept discussed above. Only
through the sharing of interests can a party fully explain why the
issue is important and can the other party begin to understand.
After identifying all the interests related to each issue, the parties
must discuss what kind of information is needed in order to
completely vet the issues and interests.54 Such information may
include scattergrams, insurance census information, comparable
employer data, and other necessary financial information.
Gathering information is the obligation of both the employer and
the union. There is usually a period of time between discussing
what information needs to be gathered and the beginning of the
actual negotiations as information gathering may take some
time. It is critical that all participants understand the data
gathered and its significance. Only by working off shared
information and agreement as to what the financial information
means can the parties have a common economic language. This
is critical to making the process a success.
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Set up

This is about the room and physical surroundings where
bargaining is going to take place.55 While in the early days of the
process, lots of wall space was required to utilize flipchart paper,
as discussed, most IBB is now done using mind mapping
software that permits all ideas to be diagrammed. Often, a
combination of the two will be used. As for the room set-up for
collaborative bargaining, a round or rectangular table shape is
best. Unlike traditional bargaining, the participants are then
interspersed amongst each other so, preferably, a management
participant would find himself flanked on both sides by union
participants and vice-versa. In any event, during the Affinity
process, participants can expect to be standing during most of
the process.
For each of the economic issues, there is a flip-chart sheet or
mind map page identifying the topic/workspace.56 For instance,
wages, health insurance, pensions, and leaves of absence are
common individual Affinity topics.
3.

Brainwriting

This is the option generation part of the process and it naturally
follows the discussions on issues and interests.57 For stand-alone
issues and in the IBB process, individuals call out ideas and they
are added to the mind map then discussed and processed down
to a solution. If using the flip-chart method, the ideas are written
on a post-it note and placed in the appropriate category. For
example, if one of the Affinity topics is insurance, the employer
may write “increase employee premium contributions by 5%.”
The union might write “status quo on premium contributions.”
This process is happening live, and there are typically many
ideas/post-it notes in each category.58
FMCS describes that during brainwriting, “once a post-it is
placed in the workspace it becomes community property. There
is no team ownership of ideas or options.”59 Different from
traditional bargaining, participants are simply generating
options and vetting ideas. The facilitator will only direct the

Spring 2019

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

participants to move on to step four when there do not appear to
be any more solutions for any of the identified areas.60

4.

Working the Puzzle

This is the next step in the process. In addition to the workspaces
for each of the economic issues, there is one flip-chart sheet titled
“union” and one titled “employer.” We will refer to these as the
employer and the union staging areas. Between the staging areas
is a sheet titled what FMCS calls the Zone of Possible Agreement
(“ZOPA”).61 This is what will become the parties’ tentative
agreement. As individuals review the options posted for each of
the economic issues, if a party finds an acceptable solution, the
party can move that solution to their staging area. For instance,
if under “health insurance” the union finds it acceptable for the
employer to have the latitude to change carriers, union
participants will move a post-it note stating such to the union
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staging area. Similarly, if the employer is agreeable to an
additional paid sick day and a new provision that employees
forfeit sick days not taken, the employer can put those two
solutions/post-it notes together and move them to the employer
silo. Ideally, there will be solutions for all outstanding economic
issues on either the employer’s or the union’s staging areas or
both. Additionally, because the parties know they have to find
agreeable final solutions to all economic issues, the employer
does not move solutions to its staging area that the employer
knows will not be agreeable to the union and vice-versa.62
Each party assesses the other party’s posted solutions and ideas.
As the union participants now know what is acceptable to the
employer participants, the available solutions have been
narrowed. Sometimes ideas are grouped together, and solutions
are further clarified. It is at this point that all participants are
gathered around the three sheets—the union staging area, the
employer staging area, and the ZOPA.
Now a key rule comes into play. The employer participants may
only move options from the union staging area to the ZOPA. The
union participants may only move options from the employer
staging area to the ZOPA.63 As such, the parties are forced to find
acceptable solutions within the other party’s staging area. This
process works because the parties are each working under the
understanding that they are to only move options to their staging
areas that the other side will find agreeable. The parties together
then discuss the options in the staging areas and through
“explanation, creation, linking, elimination or modification of
options,” gradually build up the ZOPA, and the formation of a
potential tentative agreement emerges.”64 This stage has been
described as “organized chaos” because of the organic nature in
which multiple discussions form at any time. Anyone is
welcomed and encouraged to join in on any discussion that is
taking place in room. Because of the “no caucus” rule there is
understanding and expectation that anyone can join in on a
conversation in the spirit of transparency, understanding, and
problem-solving.65
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Final Consensus and Approval

This occurs when the participants believe they have reached
consensus on all outstanding issues.66 Ideally, the acceptable
solutions have all been moved from the parties’ staging areas to
the ZOPA. Consensus does not mean that both parties achieved
all their objectives, but rather the agreement is one both parties
can live with and support. Consensus seeks unity between all
participants. Consensus forces discussion. It is important that
members do not simply agree to avoid conflict, but rather ask
questions, provide feedback, and consider alternatives.
The last step is the drafting of the actual contract language. As
the parties have defined what they are seeking, the drafting of
the language should ideally not be difficult.67
With any IBB process, an important step is that participants
from both teams attend a training, ideally two days in length and
facilitated by a mediator. The training is centered around team
building, explanation of the process, and discussions on
participation expectations in order to get the most successful
outcome in the bargaining process. Like the process itself, it is
crucial that the training be provided by an experienced nonparty facilitator. An unsuccessful training will likely result in an
unsuccessful interest-based bargaining process. FMCS can assist
parties in selecting the collaborative bargaining model that will
increase the odds of success for the parties based on either the
pre-training assessment, the dynamics witnessed in the training,
or a combination of the two. On rare occasions FMCS has even
recommended that parties use a traditional bargaining approach
if the parties are unable to fully commit to the collaborative
principles needed for success.
V. THE WESTMINSTER NEGOTIATIONS
A.

Pre-Negotiations

The process began on January 17 with the two-day IBB training. The training
was facilitated by Javier Ramirez and attended by twenty-two individuals,
not all of whom were going to be present for the negotiations. As the IBB
process is markedly different than the traditional negotiations some had
experienced (and in this case, only a few of the participants had been in any
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labor negotiations at all), there was great interest. As support for the process
and those who would be at the table, City staff thought it important to have
large participation in the training.
Through two back-to-back days, the participants became more comfortable
with each other. Team members from both sides were interspersed around a
U-shaped table, IAFF member next to City representative. Each team
contributed food and all meals were shared together. For two days, the
participants spent their time together in one room, building a bond engaged
in exercises and shared experiences. As Deputy Fire Chief Derik Minard
stated, “the collaborative approach took away potential barriers and brought
the teams together to work as one. It was a positive, team-building training.
This set the stage for a positive working relationship.”68
At the end of the training, the participants agreed on ground rules for the
negotiations and had collaborated to create a mission statement for the
process. The mission statement was: “To build a mutually beneficial
collective bargaining agreement though respect, trust, transparency and
collaboration.”
The selection of the bargaining team from the City side was thoughtful and
strategic, with representatives from human resources and Fire Department
administration. Fire Chief Doug Hall sat through the IBB training session
and was interested in participating but recognized that Deputy Chief Minard
and EMS Chief Erik Birk were better suited to the negotiations process.
Local 2889 was also careful in the selection of its participants, seeking to
select participants with the greatest outcome for success. While Local IAFF
counsel was not present, a firefighter/IAFF representative from the Denver
Fire Department participated in the IBB training and some of the
negotiations as support to the Westminster Local. When bargaining began
shortly thereafter, the participants felt they had trust in the process and the
other team for a strong foundation to begin bargaining.
The Ordinance requires that negotiations be completed within thirty days
from the start date, with a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) ratified by
Local 2889 membership and approved by the City Council by no later than
April 30, 2018.69 The timeline includes having a fully-ratified/approved CBA
with a January, 2019 effective date – a short timeline for a first contract.
Adopting the Affinity process for both the initial, non-economic process and
the economic issues happened organically. Upon observing the dynamics of
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the training process and realizing that the parties had a high level of
collaboration and trust, Director Ramirez suggested that the parties attempt
Affinity for all issues. Director Ramirez had not previously used the Affinity
process for a negotiation from start to finish. When asked why he made his
recommendation in Westminster, he stated that he thought the participants
could truly honor the necessary elements” that would make Affinity work:
“You all had the authority and drive to want to get a deal.”70
B.

The Negotiations

The first day of bargaining was February 8, 2018, and there was an energy in
the room from the beginning. The participants had been exchanging
information and discussing the process since the training and all participants
were anxious to begin. Colored post-it notes were available and individuals
and groups of participants began immediately contemplating what to write.
On the walls on flip-chart paper were the following broad headings of issues
for discussion: wages, provisional pay, grievance handling, discipline
representation, discipline process, union issues, promotion process,
expeditious job offers, paramedic recruitment and retention, and no-strike
clause/penalty.
The participants began moving around the room, discussing and writing
options on the post-it notes. The participants tended to gravitate toward
other team members (employer to employer and union to union) in
determining what to write on a post-it note. Human nature dictates that a
union team member wouldn’t put something on a post-it note that he/she
has not discussed with the team, and vice-versa. But all such discussions
were forced to happen in the large room as a huddle, not a caucus. A huddle
is a more fluid process. In a huddle, members of the other team are
permitted, and encouraged, to enter the conversation. It is the mediator’s job
to make the conversation broader. Deputy Chief Minard recalled, “at times,
two people would turn into a larger group to sort through the issue. At times,
Director Ramirez would make it a focal point and the collective group would
resolve it. When there were contentious issues, other team members would
recognize a conversation was not going well and intervene to bring it back on
track. This was a group effort.”71 At the end of the first day, a small economic
subcommittee was formed to gather baseline financial data and agree on a
common spreadsheet to be used for wages. Fortunately, there was a
representative from each team that was skilled at working the spreadsheets.
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Between meetings, contract language was drafted so it could be reviewed and
finalized at the next session. Sometimes the language had to be drafted after
a long day of bargaining because the parties were bargaining the very next
day. It was important that language be finalized as soon as there was
agreement so the participants could review the language while it was still
fresh and then put it aside to further narrow the issues. Some of the standard
clauses were drafted ahead of time so another subcommittee could review
the language, make any necessary edits and finalize it so this process didn’t
have to be completed at the end.
Once the participants had completed the process of moving solutions to their
respective staging areas and then into the ZOPA, which led to tentative
agreement on most of the issues, some unresolved issues were put into a
parking lot. Language was drafted for all agreed-upon issues, which was
reviewed, tweaked and finalized. The economic subcommittee worked to
finalize agreement on spreadsheets and work different scenarios to be
presented to the larger group. The parties then moved to a smaller room to
review and finalize language, work through and resolve issues in the parking
lot, and review the financial data and spreadsheets to discuss and reach
agreement on the core economic issues.
Working through the core economic issues was more challenging. Using and
tweaking the spreadsheets that provided information on wages, provisional
pay, pensions, and other related costs, the parties worked toward an
agreement. Representatives from both teams came up with a tool that would
enable the calculation of a split-year increase, which was the creative idea
that paved the way to settlement. At one point on the last day, when the
parties were quite certain they had a deal on wages, the teams agreed to
permit the City’s budget director to participate for a final number-crunching
and confirmation session.
While the parties had scheduled a total of eight full days for negotiations, the
contract was finalized with tentative agreements on all outstanding items by
the sixth scheduled day.
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Final Agreement, Ratification and Approval

The final agreement looks much like other collective bargaining agreements
with some notable language. In the preamble, it was important to capture the
parties’ view for the future, which was done with the following language:
“[t]he parties commit to maintaining a healthy, inclusive culture where all
employees are respected as contributing members of the City workforce with
the same vision and values serving our community.”
With a commitment to future joint problem-solving, the parties agreed to a
labor-management committee and joint safety committee, and other
committees as the parties deemed necessary. There is also an agreement to
work together on a promotional process, which was an issue important to
Local 2889. In February 2019, post-negotiations, the parties worked
together to complete an extensive performance improvement program,
which is in the implementation phase currently.
Because fair share fees were in jeopardy with Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31
having been heard by the Supreme Court but no decision having been issued
at the time of the negotiations, the parties decided to include a side letter on
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fair share in the event such fees were deemed unconstitutional, which they
subsequently were. 72 This was done to avoid having to renegotiate this
provision.
Because this was an important moment for the City and the Union, Local
2889 President Ron Taylor proposed to include the names of all City
employees involved in the process as part of the agreement, specifically
mentioning the fact that the agreement was reached using a “collaborative
Interest-Based Bargaining process.”
Local 2889 membership ratified the agreement unanimously on March 19,
2018, and the City Council approved the agreement on April 2, 2018, well
ahead of the ordinance’s April 30 deadline. The agreement’s effective date
was January 7, 2019 and is set to expire January 3, 2021.73 At the Council
meeting to approve the agreement, the Local 2889 Executive Board was
present to show their support for the agreement to the City Council. At that
meeting, Deputy Chief Minard stated, “the beautiful thing is we have such a
strong relationship, from our lowest fire fighter to the chief, that relationship
translated into the negotiation process. It really was not all that different
from the way we were doing business from the beginning.”74
VI. CONCLUSION
The Westminster experience is a solid example of what can be accomplished
when all stakeholders are committed to a spirit of collaboration. While this
experience was unique due to the fact the parties were able to work together
on a referendum question and then the drafting of an ordinance, the
collaboration that continued into the bargaining process and beyond was
certainly something that can be replicated. For Westminster, the participants
and stakeholders have built a model not only for future negotiations, but for
future issues of any kind.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By Student Editorial Board:
Johnny D. Derogene, Patrick J. Foote, Miranda L. Huber, and Matt Soaper
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations community. This issue focuses on
developments under the public employee collective bargaining statutes.
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Arbitration

In University Professionals of Illinois and Western Illinois University, 35
PERI ¶ 133 (IELRB 2019), the IELRB held that an arbitrator, when issuing
an award sustaining a grievance, has the authority to retain jurisdiction over
implementation of the awarded remedy. After Western Illinois University
(“WIU”) implemented a series of layoffs in January 2016, the University
Professionals of Illinois, Local 4100 grieved them. The grievances on behalf
of laid-off faculty moved to arbitration in April 2017, and the arbitrator
subsequently issued an award for some of the grievants. The award included
backpay for at least one professor, as well as a requirement that WIU
affirmatively look for placements within its system for those who had been
laid off from their original positions. The union had requested that the
arbitrator retain jurisdiction over the award to supervise its implementation
and respond to any problems that might arise. The arbitrator agreed, saying
that he would retain jurisdiction for at least 90 days while the award was
implemented. The university did not object to the arbitrator’s retention at
hearing, nor did it discuss that issue in its post-hearing brief.
Subsequently, counsel for the union sent an email to the university invoking
the retained jurisdiction over the remedy. The union alleged that the
university had not complied with the award with regard to five grievants. The
university responded with letters that were issued to those grievants; it also
stated that there was no need for further proceedings on the matter. The
union replied by continuing to request relief. Once the hearing was
scheduled, the union stated that it was now challenging WIU’s
implementation of the arbitration award for only four grievants. At this
supplemental hearing, the university stated that this dispute could only be
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decided by the IELRB; the union continued to argue that the issue was within
the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.
The arbitrator’s supplemental award concluded that the university had not
made a good faith effort to alter its decision to lay off one grievant; as to the
other grievants, the arbitrator noted that the university was not required to
displace another employee to find work for a grievant but also could not take
unusual measures to avoid giving the grievants work. That reasoning led the
arbitrator to find that WIU had failed to implement the original award as to
one other grievant. The arbitrator also directed that the grievant be made
whole for the semester she had missed and be given the opportunity to teach
the following school year. Afterward, the union requested a second
supplemental award; when the arbitrator requested WIU’s response, the
university noted that the matter was pending before the IELRB and that an
IELRB decision would moot the union’s request. The arbitrator determined
that he would let the IELRB rule on the charge; if the IELRB found he had
jurisdiction, he would then rule on the merits.
The IELRB held that the arbitrator could retain jurisdiction over the award.
The IELRB noted that arbitrators’ retention of jurisdiction over
implementation of a remedy was commonly upheld in Illinois. In
Pennsylvania – the state whose labor relations law served as a model for the
IELRA – the courts have also upheld arbitrators’ retention of jurisdiction.
WIU contended before that the issue of compliance with the award was
within the IELRB’s exclusive primary jurisdiction and that that issue was
beyond the arbitrator’s authority under the collective bargaining agreement.
The IELRB acknowledged that it, instead of the courts, has exclusive primary
jurisdiction over initially determining compliance issues. However, the
Labor Board noted that its exclusive primary jurisdiction did not preclude an
arbitrator from also retaining jurisdiction over the award that he or she
issued.
The IELRB also held that the arbitrator had not exceeded his contractual
authority in issuing the supplemental award. WIU argued that the
arbitrator’s supplemental award violated a provision in the collective
bargaining agreement which stated that “arbitration shall be confined solely
to ... the precise issue(s) submitted to arbitration” and that “[t]he arbitrator
shall have no authority to determine any other issues.” The IELRB was
unpersuaded by WIU’s argument. It noted that the supplemental award
concerning the remedy in the original award did not create a new issue. To
the contrary, it was part of the issues the parties had already agreed to
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arbitrate: what the remedy should be. The IELRB finally noted that the
arbitrator’s retention of his jurisdiction allowed him to determine an
appropriate remedy: the precise outcome for which the parties had already
bargained.
As a result, the IELRB found that the supplemental award was binding and
upheld the arbitrator’s finding that WIU had not complied with the original
award. Therefore, it held, WIU violated the IELRA by failing to comply with
the arbitration awards.
B.

Duty to Bargain

In Rock Valley College Support Staff, Local 6569, IFT-AFT and Rock Valley
College, 35 PERI ¶ 150 (IELRB 2019), the IELRB reversed the Administrative
Law Judge’s recommended decision that the college violated Section 14(a)(5)
of the IELRA by implementing its last, best and final offer, finding that the
parties had reached an impasse in their negotiations. The IELRB affirmed
the ALJ’s decision that the college violated Section 14(a)(5) by changing the
holiday schedule, but it did not violate Section 14(a)(5) when it unilaterally
ended merit pay and pay increases for increased workloads.
During the 2016-2017 school year, the newly-certified union and the college
were in negotiations for their first collective bargaining agreement. During
this time, Rock Valley College was in severe financial trouble. In February of
2017, the college submitted its best and final offer to the union and due to
the impasse, implemented its unilateral changes. The union contended that
these changes were illegal because they had not reached an impasse.
The union also alleged that the college committed an unfair labor practices
by unilaterally changing two policies. Prior to negotiations, Rock Valley’s
employee handbook stated that the college’s board had discretion to decide
whether the college would stay open between Christmas and New Year’s.
From 2008 to 2015, the college closed and granted employees paid holidays.
The board decided that, for 2017, the employees would be required to work
on December 26-28, 2017. The union contended that this constituted a
unilateral change in a mandatory subject of bargaining, while the college
stated the decision was a matter of managerial right. A second college policy
that pre-dated negotiations concerned employee pay increases. This policy
stated that employees would receive annual salary reviews and pay increases
would be based on performance, promotions, or changes to the salary ranges
of each position. The past practice by the college board was mixed on this
issue. It had in some years given performance-based increases and in other
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years given flat increases. The union argued that the practice was to give
increases each year and the college was required to follow that practice while
negotiations continued.
The IELRB held that the change to the holiday schedule was a mandatory
subject of bargaining. The IELRB explained that converting paid time off to
working time was a change regarding the employees’ wages. Further, the
IELRB reasoned, it did not impede managerial rights clause because,
although management had the authority to decide whether the college would
be open, the changing of pay statuses was a mandatory subject to bargain.
With regard to the pay increase policy, the IELRB held that the employees
were not owed increases because there was no consistent past practice on
which employees could justifiably rely. Finally, the IELRB decided that
college did not violate section 14(a)(5) when it implemented its final offer in
negotiations because the parties did reach an impasse. The IELRB examined
the parties’ offers and counter-offers and found that the union had not made
any material movement over three months. The IELRB explained that
because the union had not budged on its proposals despite multiple meetings
and appeared to not fully grasp the college’s financial troubles nor address
them in its offers, the college had no other choice but to declare an impasse.
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Supervisors

In AFSCME Council 31 and City of Chicago, 35 PERI ¶ 129 (ILRB Local Panel
2019), the ILRB Local Panel upheld the ALJ’s findings dismissing a majority
interest petition that the union filed in which it sought to represent a group
of City of Chicago employees in the job title Supervising Disease Control
Investigator (SDCI) at the City’s Department of Public Health, and to include
the employees in one of the union’s existing bargaining units. The Local
Panel agreed with the Union that its majority interest petition was not barred
by a 10-year-old Board-issued certification of representation that expressly
excluded the employees at issue from the bargaining unit. Second, the Local
Panel found in favor of the city that the SDCI employees were supervisors
within the meaning of Section 3(r) of the IPLRA; therefore, the union could
not include them in the bargaining unit, since they were outside of the
IPLRA’s protection.
This case began in 2016 when AFSCME filed a majority interest petition
seeking to represent a group of SDCI’s employees and the city responded
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with two objections. First, the city argued that the union was barred from
seeking to represent the SDCI employees because the ILRB issued a
certification of representative in 2008 that expressly excluded them from the
bargaining unit in which the union was seeking to include them. The Local
Panel agreed with the ALJ that the exclusionary clause in the 2008
certification was insufficient to preclude the union from seeking to represent
the SDCI employees because the clause failed to identify the reason for
excluding them from the bargaining unit. In so holding, the ILRB relied on
its long-standing rule that an exclusionary clause that does not identify the
reason for excluding certain employees from a bargaining unit is insufficient
to preclude a union form seeking to organize the excluded employees, unless
the union waived its right to organize the employees by specifically agreeing
with the employer that it would refrain from doing so. The Board agreed with
the ALJ that the city presented no evidence of a “quid pro quo agreement”
between it and the union concerning exclusion of the employees from the
bargaining unit as a result of the 2008 certification, nor any reason for the
exclusion.
Second, the city argued that the SDCI employees were supervisors within the
meaning of the IPLRA, and therefore, Section 3(r) precluded their inclusion
in the bargaining unit. The ILRB agreed with the ALJ that the SDCI
employees were supervisors. Applying the four-part supervisory test, the ALJ
found that there was sufficient evidence to establish that (1) the SDCI
employees’ principal work substantially differed from their subordinates’
work; (2) they exercised supervisory authority; (3) with independent
judgment; and (4) devoted a preponderance of their time exercising their
supervisory authority.
The ILRB upheld the ALJ’s conclusion that the SDCI employees possessed
the supervisory authority to discipline and direct and they did so with the
requisite independent judgment. The ILRB agreed that the SDCI employees
directed their subordinates by assigning, overseeing, reviewing, and
evaluating subordinates’ work, and approving time-off requests. These
actions gave the SDCI employees discretionary authority to affect the terms
and conditions of their subordinates’ employment. The Local Panel further
agreed that the SDCI employees devoted a preponderance of their time
exercising supervisory authority over their subordinates. Accordingly, the
ILRB dismissed the union’s certification petition on the ground that the
SDCI employees were supervisors within the meaning of Section 3(r) of the
IPLRA.

